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Abstract:  
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership is the largest proposed trade agreement in 
history, affecting a total of 800 million people. Included in this trade agreement are provisions 
that challenge traditional ideas of state sovereignty. Most important of these are Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement provisions. These provisions allow corporations to circumvent domestic 
court systems and sue national governments before a tribunal that is insulated from judicial 
review. While a nation might want to exercise its sovereign right to regulate on the behalf of the 
safety and welfare of its populace, the potential effect on the assets of its foreign investors can 
lead to a regulatory chill affect causing governments to cancel its adoption of legitimate 
regulatory changes because of the threat of arbitration.  
To further investigate the effect of these provisions on state sovereignty, this thesis will employ 
the neo-Gramscian theory of international relations. Antonio Gramsci and the theorists of neo-
Gramscianism break with the notions of state centrism and focus instead on the social classes 
that exercise global governance. By taking ISDS out of the law perspective and into an 
international relations perspective, we, with the help of Gramsci, can begin to identify the 
possible motives of such provisions and, more importantly, attempt to uncover the true origins of 
power and hegemony.  
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2 Introduction 
From the ancient silk roads stretching across the expanse of Eurasia, to the ultra-modern 
behemoth containerships traversing the world’s ocean, trade has been, and continues to be, an 
integral part of the history of the world. It has been crucial for the cultural interaction of different 
societies and therefore is the very essence of internationalism. While trade today has become 
more globalized than ever, it has also has developed into an intensely economically competitive 
affair. State economies are more closely linked than ever forming, in essence, a hugely 
competitive global market. As trade continues to expand and develop, the traditional concepts of 
state borders, territory and the understanding of sovereignty become challenged.  
Today, the world is witnessing the development of the largest trade proposal the world 
has ever seen: the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, or the TTIP.  The TTIP is a 
trade agreement between the Unites States and the European Union that will remove economic 
barriers for a wide range of economic sectors to make it easier to trade goods and services.
1
 On 
top of cutting tariffs, the EU and the US want to tackle barriers behind the customs border, such 
as differences in technical regulations, standards and approval procedures.
2
 Most importantly, 
this trade agreement contains forms of regulation that undermine traditional understandings of 
state sovereignty. An important form of regulation that is contained in this treaty are Investor-
State Dispute Settlement provisions or, ISDS.  ISDS has the most salient effect of state 
sovereignty because it allows corporations to circumvent domestic court systems and sue 
national governments (but not vice versa) for potentially enormous sums of money. Instead of 
going to domestic, public courts, litigations are settled using a private arbitral model which has 
been criticized for its lack of transparency and accountability.
3
 The preferences given to 
transnational corporations when it comes to protecting foreign investment are at the expense of 
the sovereign right of a state to regulate for the benefit of its own populace.  
This principal of sovereignty is associated with the emergence of the modern state system. 
Introduced at the end of the Thirty Years War by the Treaty of Westphalia, it was the agreement 
                                                 
1
 European Commission: What is the TTIP? 
2
 Ibid.  
3
 Van Harten (2008), p. 10.  
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among European rulers to recognize each other’s right to autonomously rule their own territory 
without outside interference. In the course of the subsequent four centuries, it has formed the 
normative structure the modern world order.
4
 Globalization is challenging the traditional idea of 
the Westphalian state. International institutions, formed by western powers in the 20
th
 century to 
act as a global governance system, encourage states to liberalize and integrate their economies 
under a capitalist ideal, thereby making the traditional idea of the sovereign state appear less 
significant. While trying to further integrate states the global market, states become pressured to 
comply with the laws and values of the trade and investment regime. This expansion of the 
capitalist ideal can also be seen as “an assault on another nation’s culture and politics that almost 
guarantees a collision.”5 Companies providing goods and services can today quite easily locate 
themselves in a foreign country to the extent that is possible ‘to produce a product anywhere, 
using resources from anywhere, by a company located anywhere, to be sold anywhere.’6 
Opening borders to trade can be healthy for nations because it can support higher paying jobs, 
spur economic growth and enhance competitiveness.
7
 But at the same time, massive international 
trade agreements involving millions of people and billions of euros in commodities are pushing 
the very limits of globalization and challenging the traditional ideas and practice of state 
sovereignty. 
When nations become party to such trade agreements, they also agree to open their borders to 
investment flows from private individuals and companies in the form of Foreign Direct 
Investment, or FDI. The terms and conditions for investment from private individuals or 
companies of one state to another are now established through modern trade agreements. FDI has 
become an important driver of globalization and an important part of states’ economies. To be 
able to have FDI, states must go through processes to become attractive and safe for investment. 
This can include lowering corporate and income tax rates, and relaxing labor and environmental 
standards.  As the TTIP is demonstrating, the rates and ease of cross-border flows of 
merchandise, services, money and investment are quickly reaching unprecedented levels. 
However, as this paper will attempt to outline, it does not come without tradeoffs. Most notably, 
as this thesis will focus on, is the fact that the legal obstructions to these economic transactions 
                                                 
4
 Van Harten (2008), p. 10.   
5
 McMichael (2002), p. 101. Quoting Samuelson (1998).   
6
 Scholte (2005), p. 600. Quoting Naisbitt 1994, 19. 
7
 Froman, (2014), p.111. 
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between countries have greatly diminished worldwide.
8
 These diminished legal obstructions are 
greatly linked to modern trade agreements that include ISDS provisions. States therefore are 
witnessing the power and influence of their domestic institutions being sacrificed in favor of 
promoting trade and foreign investment and ensuring legal protection of investors.
9
 While trade 
can be very beneficial for a country, the tradeoffs of trade can have a considerable impact on a 
nation state’s legal and economic sovereignty.  
2.1 Paper outline 
As state sovereignty is the key idea, this thesis will begin by outlining popular theoretical 
perspectives on state sovereignty. By discussing theoretical perspectives like realism, neo-
liberalism, liberalism and neo-liberalism, insight will be gained into how the ideas and 
perspectives of sovereignty differ. In the following section, the neo-Gramscian perspective of 
International Relations will be introduced. The section will focus on ideas of the Italian Marxist 
Antonio Gramsci and his focus on the agency of elite interests. His analysis of state-society 
complexes led him to form theories on how elite social classes establish an enduring hegemony 
through the consent of subordinate classes within a state. The next section will examine how his 
ideas were refocused and in essence, reincarnated, to be able to provide relevant perspectives on 
modern-day globalization and the complexes between states and social classes on an 
international level, namely the current hegemony of the transnational corporate elite. Also 
included in this section is the process of new constitutionalism; the process of constitutional 
revision that a state carries out to ‘lock-in’ neo-liberal reforms. This is an important idea for neo-
Gramscians in that it is the crucial process for the endurance of the corporate elites’ hegemony.  
The following section will take a closer look at how and why FDI and particularly, ISDS 
have come about as well as the results of recent dispute settlements. This includes a history of 
Bilateral Investment treaties, the Investor-State Dispute Settlement provisions therein, as well as 
an explanation of the international tribunal system. The concluding section will employ the neo-
Gramscian perspective to further examine what liberal trade and investor protection means for 
states and what that will mean to the perceived class domination of the transnational corporate 
elite class focused on by neo-Gramscian theorists. The main goal is to bring ISDS out of a legal 
perspective and into an international relations perspective. By doing this, the intention is to 
                                                 
8
 Scholte (2005), p. 604.  
9
 Van Harten (2008). P. 9. 
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investigate on how this changes the nature of international relations and who the beneficiaries 
might be.  
The TTIP, the largest trade treaty ever proposed, has the potential to create the largest free 
trade area in the world, affecting 800 million people. The scale of this treaty is immense and so 
are its potential effects on geopolitics and economic globalization. Being aware of what it 
contains is crucial to understanding the forward motions of globalization and attempting to shed 
light on the question: How does the inclusion of ISDS provisions in an international trade 
agreement affect state sovereignty? 
 
2.2 The TTIP: The latest in global economic integration 
2.2.1 Scope  
The TTIP may create the world’s largest free trade area in the world. According to a 
study commissioned by the European Union, this agreement could possibly boost the Europeans 
Union’s economy by €120 billion, the United States’ economy by €90 billion and the economy 
of the Rest of World by €100 billion.10 Because the EU and US’s trade relationship is already the 
largest in the world, resulting in €2 billion every day, every trade barrier removed could result in 
significant economic gains.
11
 The US and the EU are also each other’s most important 
destinations for foreign investment; a quarter of European outward Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) stock goes to the US and the US accounts for about one-third of EU inward FDI (see 
figures 1 and 2 below).
12
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10
 Francois, Joseph (2014). This study was commissioned by the European Union.  
11
 Ibid, p.vii. 
12
 Ibid, p.10-12. 
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Figure 1 – Outward FDI                Figure 2 - Inward FDI    (source: Eurostat, 2010) 
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2.2.2 Sticking Points: Focus - ISDS 
An economic agreement of this scale is likely to raise questions and concerns. Since 
negotiations have started in June of 2013, many sticking points have come to light. Some of the 
most important are disagreements over food safety, environmental standards, the roles of state 
governments,
13
concerns over the reduction of regulatory policies for public health,
14
 intellectual 
property, cyber security,
15
 and the inclusion of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) 
provisions.
16
 The ISDS provisions are perhaps the most important sticking points to this proposal 
and have been the fuel for many protests and anti-TTIP websites. In fact, it has been so 
controversial that 4
th
 round negotiations in March of 2014 were temporarily suspended due to 
protests.
17
  
                                                 
13
 Fox, Benjamin (EUObserver, 2014), p. 1.  
14
 Bollyky, Thomas, and  Anu Bradford (Foreign Affairs, 2014), p. 2. 
15
 Barker (2013).  
16
 Webb (Library of House of Commons 2014), p.5.  
17
 Donnan (Financial Times, 2013). 
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Some European governments want ISDS to be excluded from the treaty, arguing that 
investors have enough legal protection in their own national courts.
18
 Others implore the 
Commission to “think big” if Europe is to generate badly needed growth.19 A declassified 
document from the European Commission provides many comments with regards to the ISDS 
clause, including that European investors in the US should have highest level of legal protection, 
that European standards should be upheld, it should provide 
“safeguard for frivolous claims,” and that the mechanism should 
be transparent, independent of arbitrators and predictable; 
ultimately demanding a “state-of-the-art agreement” unique to a 
treaty of this kind.
20
 Especially for Europe, where many states 
are going through austerity measures during the economic crisis, 
the success of a suit could lead to severe strains on its economy 
which ultimately could affect the state’s ability to provide basic 
services for its population.  
The US and the EU have the opportunity to forge a new 
kind of trade deal; one that could “serve as a catalyst for improvement of current international 
investment law regime” and improving its effects on ‘regulatory chill’ and thus restoring a 
degree of sovereignty to national governments.
21
 This trade deal could serve as a template for 
future trade deals and could even “set the ground for a multilateral breakthrough.”22 
                                                 
18
 Donnan, (Financial Times, 2014).  
19
 Letter to Cecilia Malmstroem (2014). 
20
 Directives for the Negotiation on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between the European 
Union and the United States of America (2014), p.9. 
21
 Tietje, Baetens (2014), p. 10. 
22
 Ibid.  
This trade deal could 
serve as a template for 
future trade deals and 
could even “set the 
ground for a 
multilateral 
breakthrough.” 
 -Tietje Baetens 
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2.3 State Sovereignty: theoretical perspectives 
One of the main themes for this thesis is the erosion of state sovereignty in the wake of 
increasing globalization. To understand the main issue, the idea of sovereignty must be 
understood. There has been much written on the idea of sovereignty by historians and scholars 
and their opinions can differ greatly depending on their respective theoretical perspectives. 
2.3.1 Realism 
Realism is an important tradition in international relations theory and has been the 
dominant theory of world politics since the beginning of academic international relations. 
Realists share fundamental ideas such as the anarchic nature of the international system and the 
primacy of the state in international affairs.
23
 The state centric realism shared by Machiavelli and 
Morgenthau emphasizes the state as being the supreme actor in international affairs; subject to no 
other superior authority. Perspectives like these can be useful in examining modern trade 
relations and bilateral treaties, but a crucial weakness of realism is this singular view of the state 
being sacrosanct. The importance of non-state actors such as international institutions, non-
governmental organizations and multinational firms, are not emphasized.
24
 
2.3.2 Neo-realism: State centrism and the International Political Economy 
Scholar Robert Gilpin attempts to recover some of the weaknesses of the realist theory by 
combining its ideas of statism with the realities of the modern global political economy. He 
incorporates a systemic realism focus which emphasizes the distribution of power among states 
within an international system as the principal determinant of state power.
25
 Neo-realists view 
the state as still the most important actor in both domestic and international economic affairs, but 
concede that it is not the only actor.
26
 Robert Gilpin’s interpretation of the international political 
economy assumes that the interests of states are determined not merely by their survivalist 
attitudes and desire for power, but introduces more dynamic and deeper-seated forces. He writes 
that “the economic and foreign policies of a society reflect the nation’s national interest as 
                                                 
23
 Gilpin (2001), p. 14.  
24
 Ibid. p. 14-15.  
25
 Ibid.  
26
 Ibid, p. 18.  
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defined by the dominant elite of that society.”27 He not only recognizes how much economic and 
technological forces influence the behavior of states, but also sees that in the highly integrated 
global economy, states and their elites still have the power to implement policies and channel 
economic forces in ways favorable to them and their citizens.
28
 However, this thesis intends to 
argue that within the current state of the international political economy, the abilities of the state 
to decide and implement policies and exercise its traditional sovereignty are being encroached 
upon by transnational elite behind modern investment agreements strengthened by the ISDS 
provisions that accompany them.  
2.3.3 Liberalism and Neo-Liberalism: the alternative 
Liberalism is widely seen as the alternative to realism. Liberal thinkers reject the realist’s 
view of the world as an anarchic realm and instead seek to project, among others, the values of 
justice and toleration into international relations.
29
 While neo-Realists are concerned with issues 
of state survival, neo-liberals say that states can all benefit from cooperation. Regarding the idea 
of sovereignty, Van Grasstek’s recent book about the creation and evolution of the World Trade 
Organization provides a curious and revealing definition of sovereignty, describing it, in fact, as 
a paradox. He writes “the best exercise of sovereignty is to enter into binding agreements with 
other states by which they place voluntary and mutual limits on their exercise of that 
sovereignty.”30 This very much aligns with neo-liberal conceptions of cooperation and 
interdependence of liberalist thought, as well as candidly establishing the rank of state 
sovereignty among its larger goals of global economic liberalization.  
 However, this thesis will argue that the perspectives of neo-realism and neo-liberalism 
theory limit conceptions of reality. Focusing too much on the state, its interests and continuity 
can distract from the extra-national forces that have an equal, if not greater impact. Antonio 
Gramsci and theorists of the neo-Gramscian perspective seek to expose and explain these extra-
national forces as well as emphasize how much of an impact they truly have on the current 
economic and political world order.  
                                                 
27
 Gilpin (2001), p. 19.  
28
 Ibid. p. 21.  
29
 Dunne (2006), p. 186. From: The Globalization of World Politics. 
30
 Van Grasstek (2013),  p.10. 
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3 Neo-Gramscianism: A fitting lens 
The neo-Gramscian prospective on the International Political Economy is a fitting 
framework through which this subject can be viewed. It breaks with the notions of state centrism 
and focuses on social classes that exercise global governance. The views of Italian Marxist 
Antonio Gramsci on hegemonic state-society complexes and the new awareness of the global 
character of the politico-economic order, combine to develop into the theory of Transnational 
Historical Materialism, also known as and hereby referred to as neo-Gramscianism.
31
  
3.1 Antonio Gramsci: 
The main theme of Antonio Gramsci’s work is not taking social and power relations for 
granted, but examining their origins. Gramsci emphasized the passivity and acquiescence of the 
working class with the reproduction of bourgeois hegemony and the consensual aspects of rule. 
He questions how existing social and world orders have come into being, how norms and 
practices emerge, and what forces can affect the prevailing order.
32
 One of Gramsci’s main focus 
areas was on the idea of “hegemony.” As a Marxist, his understanding of this term comes from 
his participation in the Third International. The Third International under the direction of Lenin 
referred to the Russian proletariat as both a dominant and directing class that had the consent of 
allied classes like the peasantry. This gave the proletariat a hegemony that was exercised over 
consenting classes.
33
 Gramsci took this idea and provided a different perspective.  He began 
applying it to the bourgeoisie and the capitalist class, and sought to identify areas of society over 
which these classes had gained a hegemonic position of leadership. To strengthen his argument, 
he turned to Northern Europe, where he observed that the capitalist-bourgeoisie hegemony was 
most complete.
34
 In these societies he discovered that this hegemony involved giving 
concessions to subordinate classes in return for their acquiescence to their leadership.
35
 These 
concessions would often lead to forms of social democracy which preserve capitalism while 
making it more acceptable to workers and the petty bourgeoisie.
36
 The key observation was that 
because the hegemony of the bourgeoisie was so deeply entrenched in society, they themselves 
                                                 
31
 Overbeek (2000), p.168. 
32
 Bieler, Morton (2004), p. 86.  
33
 Cox (1983), p. 163. 
34
 Cox (1983), p. 163.  
35
 Cox (1983), p.163.  
36
 Ibid.   
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did not need to run the state; the nobles and aristocrats could have the control “as long as these 
rulers recognized the hegemonic structures of civil society as the basic limits of their potential 
action.”37 This perception of hegemony led Gramsci to enlarge his definition of the state to 
include not only the administrative and executive aspects, but also the political structure in civil 
society.
38
 Gramsci identified the church, the educational system and the press as the institutions 
which helped create the mode of behavior that aligned with the hegemonic social order. By 
dominating the executive and administrative branches of government as well as the most 
influencing and persuasive structures of the civil society, the bourgeoisie bridged and fused the 
structures of state and civil society to establish a true hegemony. This true and enduring 
hegemony allowed their values to be reproduced, forming what Gramsci called a Blocco Storico, 
a Historic Bloc.
39
 
3.2 Neo-Gramscianism – Gramsci’s ideas reincarnated 
When this class hegemony is projected outward to the international level, it is seen as a 
foundation of neo-Gramscian thinking. Robert Cox, whose landmark article "Social Forces, 
States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory" in 1981 marks the beginning 
of the development of neo-Gramscian theory, describes hegemony as “manifested in the 
acceptance of ideas and supported by material resources and institutions, which is initially 
established by social forces occupying a leading role within a state, but is then projected outward 
on a world scale.”40 He reflects on ‘globally conceived society’ , writing: the “hegemonic 
concept of world order is founded not only upon the regulation of inter-state conflict but also on 
a globally-conceived society, that is, a mode of production of global extent which brings about 
links among social classes of the countries encompassed by it.”41 Stephan Gill, Robert Cox’s 
colleague and another early developer of the perspective, adds to this argument, explaining that 
the policies of institutions like the OECD, IMF, the World Bank, the WTO and the G7 are 
leading to “an erosion of democratic control.” 42  
                                                 
37
 Cox (1983), p.163.  
38
 Ibid.  
39
 Ibid, p. 164.  
40
 Bieler, Morton (2004), paraphrasing Cox, p. 87. Emphasis added. 
41
 Cox (1983), p.171. 
42
 Ibid. 
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Neo-Gramscian theorists see the world consisting of transnational relations among these 
social classes. Since globalization, these transnational 
relations have only intensified.
43
  Bastiaan Van 
Apeldoorn, political science professor belonging to the 
‘Amsterdam School’ writes that ‘the transnational’ 
contrasts the actor-centered liberal perspective on 
transnational relations and focuses on the importance of 
transnational (economic) structures.
44
  From this 
perspective, international relations have from the 
beginning been embedded within and shaped by the transnational social relations of the 
globalized capitalist world economy. To understand these transnational relations, van Apeldoorn 
writes that the transnational is not a ‘level,’ in the state- or national- sense, but “extends across 
and thereby links as well as transcends different (territorial) levels.” 45 He emphasizes how the 
process of transnational class formation and the role of the capitalist class society beyond 
national borders restructure global capitalist social relations.
46
 In turn, these transnational 
corporations run by the business elite become powerful actors with a set of ‘shared casual 
ideas’47 that propagate norms such as private enterprise and private accumulation. This illustrates 
the main ideas of neo-Gramscianism: that power has social origins. 
But why? Why do some groups in society have more power to reproduce or transform 
social structures to their perceived advantage than others? Van Apeldoorn writes that capitalist 
social relations are relations of domination bound up with an unequal distribution of material 
capabilities resulting from an unequal control over the means of production, echoing Marx’s 
words: “the world market itself forms the basis for this mode of production.”48 This unequal 
distribution of power leads to a class struggle: a struggle between those who exercise/supervise 
control over the means of production and those who actually carry out the tasks.
49
 In a 
Gramscian perspective, the hegemony of the capitalist class is not secured without the 
                                                 
43
 Van Apeldoorn (2004)., p.143. 
44 Ibid.  
45
 Ibid, p.144. 
46
 Van Apeldoorn (2004), Introduction.   
47
 Ibid, p. 8; van Apeldoorn quoting Keck and Skinnink (1998).  
48
 Overbeek, in Palan (2000), p. 169.  
49
 Ibid, p.10-13.  
“…the priorities of economic 
and social policies world-wide 
have been recast to reflect the 
new dominance of investors.” 
- Stephen Gill 
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continuous struggle within the ‘integral state,’ the political + civil society. Therefore, in a 
capitalist society, the capitalist class is a ruling class. And when this is that case, states become 
facilitators of their hegemony.  
3.3 Neo-Gramscianism: Historicizing its main themes 
These perspectives on hegemony closely relate to theories of imperialism in the 20
th
 
century which recognizes the dynamics of capitalism as being international. In the 1950’s and 
60’s, the United States became the dominant power and theorists at the time were curious as to 
how the rise of the European community would challenge this hegemony. Political sociologist 
Nicos Poulantzas first observed that during the rise of the multinational corporation after the 
Second World War, the dominant trend was not interpenetration of capital within Europe, but 
penetration by American productive capital of the European economies. His observations led to a 
realization that European class forces were reconfiguring in response to the dependence on 
American capital, or, a reproduction within Europe of American relations of production.
 50
 With 
this, Poulantzas produced the first examples of transnational relations that later became the basis 
of transnational historical materialism. It was at this time that the works of Antonio Gramsci 
resurfaced, shedding light on the role of ideas in the reproduction of bourgeois hegemony and on 
the consensual aspects of rule in developed capitalist societies.
51
 The combination of Poulantzas 
understanding of transnational class development and Gramsci’s ideas of the bourgeois 
hegemony and passivity and acquiescence of the working class gave way to the further 
development of the theory of neo-Gramscianism. 
Van Apeldoorn assists with conceptualizing the reproduction of hegemony by examining 
the various modern and historical connections between the state apparatus and corporate elite. He 
writes extensively on the United States and how American dominance aligns with a “Grand 
Strategy” of economic imperialism. He writes that the United States has constantly sought to 
promote and facilitate the global expansion of US capital through its historical “Open Door” 
policies and how this has been reproduced through strong ties between the foreign policy making 
state apparatus and America’s corporate elite.52 He explains the Open Door policy was of a non-
territorial nature that instead of seeking to dominate a foreign land, sought to open the door of 
                                                 
50
 Overbeek, in Palan (2000), p. 171.  
51
 Ibid, paraphrasing Antonio Gramsci.   
52
 Van Apeldoorn (2012), p. 591. 
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their economies to US surplus goods and capital. This is the basis of van Apeldoorn’s modern 
American imperialism views. In the final quarter of the nineteenth century, in order to overcome 
the economic depression of the time, it was agreed among the emerging corporate elite that there 
needed to be outlets for surplus goods and capital. They called for “an intelligent and spirited 
foreign policy” to assist in opening the door to foreign markets.53 This policy critically involved 
the US state to the point that it became the external representation of American transnational 
oriented capital. Van Apeldoorn argues that the excessive expansion of this US imperialism 
project carried out by the US is to a large extent still driven by the interests and ideas of US 
transnational capital.
54
 This capitalist growth spreads to other regions and provides the impetus 
to the rise of other states’ globally expanding capital, which eventually leads to the rise of 
transnational elite. However, the sheer geopolitical and geo-economic power of the US makes up 
for the difference between US capital and its competitors. 
Van Apeldoorn identifies two dimensions of this geopolitical and geo-economic power of 
the US. First is the US financial hegemony, epitomized by the reserve status of the US dollar. 
The second is its unequalled military superiority. The military assists in opening additional 
markets to FDI
55
 as well as maintaining a ‘command of the commons’.56 The US is unique 
compared to other advanced capitalist states in that its worldview reflects that of its capitalist 
class.
57
 This class dominance takes place through channels such as the formation of ideas in 
corporate-funded think tanks, the agenda-setting and lobbying of business associations, and 
through campaign finance.
58
 Behind these modes of power is a dominance of investors that have 
penetrated the state apparatus. Van Apeldoorn identifies a large majority of US cabinet 
appointees, diplomats and other senior officials that have corporate backgrounds.
59
 Because of 
                                                 
53
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these backgrounds, many in policy maker positions have worldviews that are shaped by their 
social position. 
3.4 New Constitutionalism: the hegemonic method 
When capitalists become a ruling class, they enjoy a sort of capitalist freedom, which 
requires the existence and endurance of a system which 
allows capital to flow freely between jurisdictions.
60
 
What emerge are changes to the influence and 
governance of the state and eventually to larger, 
international forms of government. By attempting to 
institutionalize the neo-liberal agenda by subordinating 
nation-state policies, a state begins to lock in neo-liberal 
reform, making it a more optimal haven for investors. 
The adjustment of state policies in favor of capitalist 
policies is what Stephen Gill calls new constitutionalism. These changes ensure investor 
freedoms and corporate property rights for transnational enterprises.
61
 He explains that what 
emerges is a pattern of authority in which capital has a greater weight and representation at the 
expense of the democratic process.
62
 These new dominant economic forces are now insulated 
from democratic rule as a result of these constitutional changes; mobile investors become 
sovereign political subjects.
63
 Capital mobility forces states to provide price and exchange rate 
stability in order to become credible in the eyes of investors.
64
  
Stephen Gill explains how the capitalist elite go about doing this in multiple ways. A 
major way is by reconfiguring state apparatuses. By making governments act as facilitators of 
market values and market discipline, they can provide legal guarantees and sanctions to 
encourage the private control of a state’s economic policy, ultimately protecting capital from 
popular democracy.
65
 Then, states go about constructing markets, especially in the fictitious 
commodities of land, labor and capital, at an international level. By making laws to prevent 
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government interference with property rights and mobile capital movements,
66
 governments are 
restricting their power for international neo-liberal credibility. As also seen in the section about 
the historical developments of International Investment agreements, neo-liberal policies have 
both coercive and consensual dimensions; coercive because many states have a need for 
(foreign) investment and consensual because states are willing to sacrifice power and control to 
get it. The pressure for a state to become internationally credible and legitimate for investors is 
intense and leads to such co-optative behavior. The result is that “key economic and strategic 
areas of policy [become] separated from democratic participation and accountability.”67 Gill goes 
on to write that “new constitutionalism is a conscious strategy to contain the democratization 
process that has involved struggles for popular representation for several centuries.”68 The 
dominant political subject in the neo-liberal universe is the investor who becomes sovereign in 
the most important areas of social and economic life.  
3.5 Foreign Direct Investment: An important driver of the global economy 
The global economy is driven to a large extent by foreign investment.
69
 The nature and scale 
of international investment has evolved rapidly amidst the continuing globalization of the world 
economy.
70
 Global bodies like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank group 
and the World Trade Organization (WTO) have been formed to promote and protect trade and 
foreign investment.
71
 Foreign direct investment has become the most important way to bring 
goods and services to foreign markets around the world.
72
 In the last thirty years, FDI has been 
growing at a staggering rate: in 1980 FDI outflows totaled around US$100 billion in, in 2007-
2011 they grew to average US$ 1.7 trillion, peaking to US$ 2.2 trillion in 2007 before the 
financial crisis.
73
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3.6  Foreign Investment: Who and Why? 
FDI is undertaken by firms that control assets abroad, also called multinational enterprises, 
which enter foreign markets mainly through mergers and acquisitions.
74
 A firm enters a foreign 
market because it increases their access to locational assets as well as its access to additional 
markets which can serve to increase a firm’s overall competitiveness.75 Governments see FDI as 
a tool to advance economic growth and development, and encourage it by liberalizing their 
regulatory frameworks, creating agencies to promote further FDI, and signing international 
investment agreements in order to attract healthy amounts of investment.
76
 However, at the same 
time, governments can also invite investment by offering low corporate tax rates, reducing taxes 
and restrictions on profits, and relaxing labor and environmental standards.
77
 Because foreign 
direct investment combines both the private and public spheres, specific trade and investment 
agreements reinforced by international law have emerged to provide structure as well as help 
settle possible disputes among parties. The following section will summarize the long history of 
international investment agreements and explain the reasons for their occurrence as well as the 
consequences they have on state sovereignty.  
3.7  International Investment Agreements: A History 
Because FDI is such an important and competitive aspect of the world economy, there has 
been a rise in the number of international investment agreements, especially bilateral investment 
treaties (BIT).
78
 The purposes of BITs are to protect investment and facilitate the operations of 
investors in their host countries.
79
 However, investment treaties are not recent concepts; in fact, 
they can be traced back to the late 18
th
 century. Tracing the history of BITs is necessary for 
understanding not only the evolution of the nature and manner of foreign investments and 
foreign investment protection, but also for understanding the foundations liberal trade and 
international investment law. Kenneth Vandevelde in his article A Brief History of International 
Investment Agreements uncovers the long history of international investment agreements. He 
organizes the history in three eras: the Colonial Era, the Post-colonial Era, and the Global Era.  
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3.7.1 International Investment Agreements: The Colonial Era 
In the Colonial Era, agreements between nations concerned themselves more with fostering 
trade relations and protecting property as opposed to investment.
80
  In fact, states in this era did 
not negotiate separate agreements for property and investment but were often included in the 
same agreement. Customary international law at this time did not offer the proper protection of 
foreign investment and sometimes it was up to the state to use diplomacy or other more extreme, 
non-legal measures to enforce the agreement. The alternative to diplomacy was military force. 
The Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe doctrine explicitly authorized the use of force by 
American troops in the Western Hemisphere to collect debts owed to American citizens.
81
  
3.7.2 International Investment Agreements: The Post-colonial Era 
 The post-Colonial era was ushered in by the end of the Second World War and lasted 
until the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is the era where BITs began to take their modern form. 
The severe economic depression following the Second World War led the victorious allies to 
consent to a liberalization of trade.
82
  This manifested into the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) in 1947 which created a major multilateral organization centered on trade but not 
investment. The GATT shifted the primary legal framework for international trade relations from 
bilateral to multilateral agreements and started successive rounds of negotiation aimed at 
worldwide trade liberalization.
83
  
It was widespread decolonization and the emergence of the Soviet bloc in the 1960’s that led 
to the first real threat to the fledgling trade and investment regime. After 1945, the principal of 
self-determination along with a growing and widespread disdain for colonialism led many 
imperials powers to shift their policies and withdraw from their previous empires.
84
 This wave of 
decolonization created many new independent but economically underdeveloped countries. 
Fierce defenders of their newly-gained independence, many of these countries closed off their 
borders to trade and foreign investment in the fear that any trade with a developed country would 
result in exploitation.
85
 Socialist states led by the Soviet Union undertook massive expropriations 
of the private sector, which included foreign held assets, and encouraged these new developing 
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countries to do the same.
86
 Convinced that economic vitality lay in state regulation rather than 
the capitalist free market, they took their case to the United Nations General Assembly. In May 
1974, the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of State (CERDS) was mandated which gave 
these states the right of full permanent sovereignty and therefore their right to expropriate foreign 
investment without paying fair market value.
87
  
Developed countries responded to this threat by creating the BIT. It dealt exclusively with 
investment and offered the most effective protection against uncompensated expropriation.
88
  
BITs were negotiated principally between a developed and a developing country; often, the 
developing country drafted the agreement and offered it to the developed country.
89
 Because of 
this design, skepticism from developing countries remained limited. By signing a BIT treaty, a 
developing country could attract much needed FDI and a developed country could insure 
genuine protection of its assets. An important innovation of the news BITs was the inclusions 
starting in the 1960’s of provisions in which the host state consented to arbitration of certain 
disputes with investors.
90
 In 1965, a convention established the International Centre for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ISCID). An entity of the World Bank, it intended to provide 
a venue for arbitration disputes and represented, for the first time, an effective remedy for 
unlawful actions by host states that effects investments.  From 1959 – 1980, the number of BITs 
agreed between countries grew steadily, reaching 219 at the end of the era.  
3.7.3 International Investment Agreements: The Global Era 
The coupling of trade and investment into a single entity started at the end of the 1980s and 
brought about many changes in the context in which agreements were negotiated. The conclusion 
of the Uruguay Round of GATT (focused on investment) and the General Agreement on Trade 
and Services (GATS) (focused on removing barriers of trade and services) resulted in the 
creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. Trade and investment provisions were 
now under its jurisdiction and the number of BITs exploded.
91
 Vandevelde explains that the 
explosion of the number of BITs seems to have been caused by a victory in market ideology. 
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Asian economies grew at a rate of 3 times that of Latin America and by doing so had 
demonstrated that foreign investments and global integration could be successful.
92
 Also, the 
collapse of the Soviet bloc further vindicated the free market ideology as a successful economic 
policy. Another important factor in the rise of the BITs was the massive debts created by Regan 
administration amidst the economic crisis. This absorbed much of the available capital which 
was allotted to developing countries and they thus had little choice than to seek private foreign 
investment to support their development  
The coupling of trade and investment into a single treaty reflects a change in the nature of 
economic activity. Foreign investment is now seen not as a means of replacing trade, but of 
promoting it.
93
 Instead of establishing a foreign subsidiary to deliver goods to a foreign market to 
bypass, for example, high tariffs, foreign subsidies in the global era are now links in a larger 
chain of production. Foreign subsidiaries now import raw materials from other subsidiaries and 
export a product further to other subsidiaries for refinement. This deeper economic integration 
required lowering barriers to both trade and investment.
94
  
3.7.4 International Investment Agreements: Conclusion 
This historical background not only shows a timeline for the development and popularity of 
the BIT, but also shows a shift of norms concerning international investments and international 
investment protection. In the post-colonial era, investment agreements were used to protect 
investments of developed nations against expropriation, whereas in the Global Era, investments 
agreements were meant to liberalize investment and remove barriers to trade. Investment 
agreements, therefore, have become instruments of globalization.
95
 But, as these trade 
agreements proliferated, so do disputes between investors and states.  
3.8 ISDS and the Right to Regulate 
As explained in the previous section, clauses for investor protection have been introduced in 
trade agreements because it increases protection of corporations wanting to invest in developing 
countries with weaker systems of law, i.e. developing countries.
96
 However, since the 1980’s, the 
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number of ISDS cases had risen dramatically, some involving billions of euros.
97
 ISDS clauses 
give investors with business activities in a foreign country the ability to sue the host country if its 
policies lead to reduced profits.
 98  
In many cases, the desire of the host country to change its 
policies comes from its sovereign right to regulate on the behalf of the safety and welfare of its 
population. However, when a country realizes that its desired policy changes may have an effect 
the assets of foreign investors, it can lead to ‘regulatory chill’ affect; causing governments to 
cancel its adoption of legitimate regulatory changes for the environment, health, or natural 
resources because of the threat of arbitration.
99
 
3.8.1 The International Tribunal System 
Suits like these eventually go to an international tribunal. The International Center for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and the United Nations Commission of International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) are the most commonly used arbitration institutions. In the tribunals, 
each party names one arbiter and they together agree on a third arbiter who serves as tribunal 
chairman.
100
 If no agreement is reached, the ICSID secretariat chooses the tribunal 
chairman.
101
The International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) is one of 
the most important bodies in the dispute settlement system and is an institution under the 
umbrella of the World Bank.
102
  
The structure of this system is a focus point for much critique. Gus Van Harten, law 
professor at York University in Canada is a specialist in investor-state arbitration. One of his 
main critiques is that tribunals consist of for-profit arbitrators that are insulated from judicial 
review.
103
 He criticizes the implementation of this system in developed countries and that if the 
system of litigation is extended to developed countries, “the mechanism will be locked in for 
decades as part of global government.”104 He goes onto explain that this poses issues of 
democratic accountability, policy flexibility and fiscal risk. To illustrate the complaints that have 
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been raised against this system, the following section will examine two case studies in which a 
dispute between a corporation and a nation has reached arbitration. 
3.8.1.1 Case Study: Vattenfall AB v. Federal Republic of Germany 
There have been many claims brought upon foreign governments over the decades, but one 
of the most notorious cases of an ISDS claim is the claim brought by Swedish energy group 
Vattenfall AB against the Federal Republic of Germany. Vattenfall is a Swedish energy company 
that builds and maintains power plants. After building two nuclear power plants in northern 
Germany, Vattenfall sued the host country after its parliament decided to begin phasing out 
nuclear energy as a response to the massive anti-nuclear demonstrations after the Fukushima 
disaster in Japan. Vattenfall is thus suing the German state for damages and is expected to 
receive €700 million in compensation. This puts regulators between a rock and a hard place: 
even if countries want to make decisions that would directly benefit their populations, like 
Germany’s desire to phase out atomic energy for safety and health reasons, countries would 
think twice about such decision because it might threaten such a law suit under the ISDS clause. 
Therefore, one of the major concerns of the ISDS clause in the TTIP agreement are that it could 
undermine both public services and the right of national governments to regulate. 
3.8.1.2 Case Study: Occidental Petroleum Corporation vs Republic of Ecuador 
Another case of infamous proportions is that of US oil company Occidental Petroleum 
Corporation (Oxy) vs. the Republic of Ecuador. In 2012, an ICSID tribunal determined that 
Ecuador breached the US-Ecuador bilateral investment treaty and the claimant was eventually 
awarded damages of US$ 1.061 billion.
105
 After the country amended its Hydrocarbons law to 
allow parties to enter into services contracts, Oxy entered the country under a services contract 
with Petroecuador, Ecuador’s national oil company, to search for hydrocarbons in a certain block 
of Ecuador’s Amazon region.106 
In 2000, Oxy had entered into an agreement with a Canadian energy corporation Alberta 
Energy Corporation (AEC) and acquired a 40% economic interest in the block in return for 
capital contributions. This transfer however violated the participation contract and Ecuadorian 
                                                 
105
 Initially, the award was 2.3 billion USD but this has since been reduced to 1.06 billion USD after an annulment 
procedure started by Ecuador in 2015 resulted in a 40 percent reduction of the original compensation owed to the 
claimants. (ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11. Occidental Petroleum Corporation vs. the Republic of Ecuador) 
 
106
 Cheng, Bento (2012). 
22 
 
Law in that it went through without ministerial approval. Ecuador then terminated its contract 
and proceeded to seize all of Occidental Petroleum’s property. Oxy argued that Ecuador 
breached its obligations under both the Participation Contract and the BIT, whereas Ecuador 
argued that the agreement with AEC violated Ecuadorian law. It also argued that the seizing of 
property complied fully with the BIT and International Law, and that no appropriation took 
place.  The tribunal ruled that the agreement Oxy had with AEC was in violation of Ecuadoran 
law in that it was not approved by the government. But it also held that the terminal of its 
Participation Contract was a disproportionate response and should only have been done as a last 
resort. 
This case demonstrates the great power of the investment treaty tribunals. Not only are 
they overseeing cases between governments and corporation and regularly allocating 
responsibilities between these parties, they also have the authority to impose fines of over a 
billion dollars.
107
 Tai-Heng Cheng and Lucas Bento, partners at major law firms in the US and 
writers of a commentary about this case, write “this power [of investment treaty tribunals] is 
nothing short of the ability to radically alter the wealth of shareholders and workers of investor 
companies, as well as the well-being of citizens and residents of host states.”108 
3.8.2 Corporate Lobbying 
The main beneficiaries of investor-state arbitration have been very large companies 
which qualify as foreign investors under treaties. Their ability to sue nations is remarkable for 
various reasons. Van Harten explains that the term ‘investment’ is defined broadly in the treaty 
to include not just land and factories but also more creative concepts such as derivatives, swaps, 
permits, and patents. He also explains that foreign investors, unlike anyone else, have been given 
the right to sidestep domestic courts when they have an international claim. They are able to 
have their claim decided in what Van Harten calls an “advantageous non-judicial forum that is 
closed to other actors whose rights or interests are affected.” These corporations usually receive 
large amount of public money, sometimes where a domestic court would have not awarded.  
Because corporations have these kinds of rights when they bring a case to arbitration, 
corporations are very much in favor of including ISDS clauses in such trade agreements as the 
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TTIP. According to Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO), a non-profit research group, 
European Commission officials have held hundreds of meetings with lobbyists to discuss the 
TTIP. The European Commissioner for Trade Cecilia Malström, in her first six months of taking 
office in 2014, has had 121 one-on-one lobby meeting behind closed doors.
109
 100 of these 
meetings were with business lobbyists and the others, only around 20, held with public interests 
groups. Between January 2012 and February 2014, the commission’s trade department had 597 
behind-closed-door meetings with lobbyists to discuss negotiations. 528 of these meetings were 
with business lobbyists and only 53 were with groups such as trade unions and NGOs, the 
remainder being with other parties such as public institutions and academics.
110
 Among the 
largest corporate lobby groups are organizations like BusinessEurope, the most powerful 
corporate lobby group in the EU and the Transatlantic Business Council, a corporate lobby group 
representing over 70 EU and US based multinationals.  
Statistics like these should be worrisome. With this kind of lobbying power, corporations 
are effectively co-writing the treaty, even though citizens may be against it. European Parliament 
member Molly Scott Cato remarked after describing the secure European Parliament reading 
room and the 14 page document she needed to sign, ultimately promising not to share any 
information with constituents, that she was not reassured whatsoever either that the process of 
negotiating a trade deal is democratic, or that the negotiators are operating on behalf of citizens. 
In her words, “this is a corporate discussion, not a democratic one.”111  
4 Conclusion  
To a neo-Gramscian theorist, ISDS is a phenomenon that has come about as a result of 
transnational capitalist class hegemony. It is an instrument for the continued dominance of 
investors/transnational capitalist class. The capitalist bourgeoisie have established their 
dominance at home by creating consumerist tendencies that permeate state and civil societies. 
This dominance is now spreading internationally in tandem with other foreign transnationally 
minded capitalists with the goal of locking in their ideas and values in all countries, developed 
and undeveloped. If dominance indeed reflects a hegemony, Stephen Gill writes that it will be 
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universal in form and will not appear as those of a particular class and even will give some 
satisfaction to subordinate groups while not undermining the leadership or vital interests of the 
hegemonic class.
112
 An important method of locking in these values was observed in the section 
new-constitutionalism: by limiting the nation-state’s role in capital movement, the transnational 
capitalists are further solidifying their hold on the state governing mechanisms and improving 
the durability of their hegemonic order. Gramsci writes that the movement towards hegemony is 
a ‘passage from the structure to the sphere of complex superstructures,’ meaning they pass from 
the specific interests of a group or class to the building of institutions and elaborate ideologies.
113
 
Gill writes that organizations like the “WTO [embody] the mature version of the ‘new-
constitutionalism’, whereby the political and bureaucratic elites responsible for managing global 
economic flows do so with a growing insulation from popular scrutiny.”114 This is part of a 
project to attempt to construct a stable, hegemonic ordering of the world. Opening economics to 
the world market and eroding the power and jurisdiction of the state is broadening the domain of 
the ever powerful transnational capitalist class
115
  
The TTIP, if passed into law, will also be an instrument for the continuation of this 
dominance of investors/transnational capitalist class dominance. The goals of the capitalist elite 
are trying to become further institutionalized with trade treaties of ever greater scopes, like the 
TTIP. By attempting to tie together the world’s two largest economies, the corporate elite are 
further embedding their hegemony. By having their ideas spill over national boundaries, their 
values and hegemony increasingly becomes an internationally expansive phenomenon.
116
 In the 
case of a dispute between a state and a corporation, the fact that ISDS litigation takes place 
behind closed doors and out of the jurisdiction of the nation-state is a prime example of new 
constitutionalism and class dominance. States agree to this because the current investment 
regime continues to give preference to transnational corporations when it comes to protecting 
foreign investment. Van Apeldoorn’s work regarding corporate-elite networks in the United 
States helps us understand how states agree and even assist in the spreading of a hegemonic idea. 
By comparing the corporate networks of grand policy makers, an idea is gained into how the 
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views of grand strategy makers are linked to those particular social groups. Their worldview has 
become shaped by leading sections of the corporate community to which grand strategy makers 
are closely linked. This world view is oriented towards establishing global hegemony through 
creating and maintaining an ‘open’ liberal world order.117  
This leads to an important question: Is the state still important? Neo-Gramscian theorists say 
that states play a facilitating, rather than leading role in social and economic affairs. The state is 
still important, but it is facing enormous pressure to be restructured. Gramsci sheds light on this 
difficult issue when he reflects on international relations in his prison diaries:  
“Do international relations precede or follow (logically) fundamental 
social relations? There can be no doubt that they follow. Any organic 
innovation in the social structure, through its technical military 
expressions, modifies organically absolute and relative relations in the 
international field too.”118 
By this he means that basic changes in international power relations or world order can be traced 
back to fundamental changes in social relations. The state remained for Gramsci the basic entity 
in international relations as well as social relations. It is the place where social conflicts take 
place and also where hegemonies and social classes can be built. For Gramsci, an emergence of a 
bloc must take place within a state; only from there can spill over national boundaries and 
become an international phenomenon.
119
 This is also where the process of counter hegemony 
begins: within the state. Gramsci writes that world orders are grounded in social relations, and a 
‘structural change in the world order can be traced back to fundamental changes in social 
relations in the national political orders which correspond to national structures of social 
relations.’120 To change the current world order, the effort to build new historic blocs must begin 
within national boundaries. The most notable public opposition has occurred in Germany which 
has led the German government to push for an exclusion of ISDS provisions in the deal.
121
 This 
could be seen as a struggle for dominance between the neoliberal transnational interests and 
national interests.  
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Mark Mazower, in his book Governing the World, writes that there has been a 
“multifaceted erosion of sovereignty.” He notices a trend in how international government and 
regulation bodies are undermining public bodies that define state sovereignty and in doing so 
“assail the internal legitimacy, capacity and cohesion of individual states.”122 However, for neo-
Gramscian theorists, states are by no means powerless. The state remains for them the origin of 
power and is where power must begin before it can be projected. Amidst trade agreements of 
ever broadening scopes, states must constantly guard against actual or potential threats to their 
political and economic independence,
123
 and beware of being exposed to a marketplace 
dominated by more powerful actors. 124 
4.1 The value of neo-Gramscian theory 
Neo-Gramscian theory has proven helpful in bringing ISDS out of a law perspective and 
into an international relations perspective. Its focus on societal structures and hegemony is 
helpful for suggesting underlying motivations behind large multinational trade agreements and 
the methods to resolve high profile investor-state disputes. By understanding Gramsci’s original 
ideas of hegemony, it becomes clear how hegemonic structures start within societies of states 
and how they are projected outwards. Gramsci’s main goal was to uncover the roots of power. 
This involved not only identifying societal classes and their power over subordinate classes, but 
more importantly by expanding the realm of the state to include the modes in which these groups 
gain power, how norms and practices emerge and how a prevailing order might transform.
125
 
The greatest strength of Neo-Gramscianism is that is helps reveal the agency of elite 
interests. But therein also lies its weakness. The perspective focuses perhaps too much on the 
interests of the elite and less interested in the agency of other social forces and creative forms of 
resistance.
126
 Neo-Gramscian theory would struggle to define, for example, the activism against 
TTIP and particularly the fact that many activist groups do not manifest themselves within a 
certain state but gain recognition using the internet and media. While neo-Gramscianism can be 
extremely useful in providing perspectives on important themes and structures of this modern 
age, like globalization and the International Political Economy, it might struggle to provide 
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insight into other important topics in International Relations; for instance, human rights, global 
health, environmental issues, or gender issues.  
Despite its weaknesses, neo-Gramscianism is a very well-developed and surprisingly 
flexible theory. Theorists have done well to make the definition of the state as flexible as 
possible. The state can be transcended by social groups but it always lies at the heart of 
international power structures. The concept of new constitutionalism introduced by Stephen Gill 
is effective in outlining a tangible method in how hegemony is practiced and how the concept of 
consent is employed to meet the greater goals of the hegemonic bloc, and in particular, how the 
rules that benefit the transnational elite are used to limit the options of nation-states. Perhaps 
most remarkable about this theoretical perspective is how theorists have succeeded with making 
the ideas of Antonio Gramsci remain relevant, despite the fact that his writings date back to the 
mid 1920’s. Antonio Gramsci was a remarkable thinker and had the unique ability to examine 
and deconstruct society and its underlying structures. His ideas are relevant and they deserve to 
remain in the literature of International Relations theory. When asking ourselves “who benefits?” 
when discussing important subjects as this, neo-Gramscian theory can undoubtedly assist in 
providing a valuable insight into a possible answer. Particularly, for the purposes of this thesis, 
the possible trade-offs of trade, with the help of Gramsci and his inspired theorists, become 
increasingly discernible.  
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